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COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
that nothing shall be construed to affect, alter or repeal any provision of the
Wbrkmen's Compensation Law. The intent of the statute is dearly stated;
therefore, the exclusiveness of the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation
Law is not altered by the Court of Claims Act.
Substfiution Of Attorneys
By virtue of the peculiar relationship existing between attorneys and their
clients, the latter are accorded the privilege of discharging the former for any
reason whatsoever, in which event any existing agreement of retainer is terminated and the attorney may recover only on a quantum meruit basis, for services
rendered, 5 unless, without objection, the discharged attorney elects to take a
percentage of the final judgment or settlement, where a substitution of attorneys
takes place.6 The substitution of attorneys by a client is generally governed by
Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Practice, and may be done either by stipulation or by order,7 an order directing substitution being without prejudice to a
8
charging lien of the first attorney.
The problem most intimately connected with the discharge or substitution
of attorneys is that of establishing the compensation due for services rendered
by the attorney being discharged. By statute, an attorney's compensation is
made subjec to agreement "express or implied, which is not restrained by law."9
There is no general power on the part of the courts to limit the amount of the
fees charged by an attorney' ° in the absence of facts indicating that the charge
was "extortionate or excessive, or out of proportion to the value of the services""
or that the agreement "was induced by fraud, or, in view of the nature of the
clim, that the compensation provided for was so excessive as to evince a
5.
6.
1955).
7.

Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 114 N.E. 46 (1916).
Podbielski v. Conrad, 286 App. Div. 1040, 145 N.Y.S.2d 321 (2d Dep't

N.Y.R. Civ. PpAc. 56:
An attorney of record for an adult party or corporation may
be changed by the filing with the clerk of the court in which
action or proceeding may be pending of a stipulation in
writing for such change of attorney, signed by the attorney
and signed and acknowledged by the party. The making and
filing of such a stipulation shall have the same effect as an
order of substitution. An attorney may also be changed by
order.
See also N.Y. Cxv. PRAc. AcT §240 which pertains generally when an attorney has
been discharged or otherwise incapacitated.
8. Re Lydig, 262 N.Y. 408, 187 N.E. 298 (1933). The attorney's charging
lien is established under authority of N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW §475.
9. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW §474.
10. Murray v. Waring Hat Mfg. Co., 142 App. Div. 514, 127 N.Y. Supp. 78
(2d Dep't 1911); Werner v. Knowlton, 107 App. Div. 158, 94 N.Y. Supp. 1054
(4th Dep't 1905).
11. Ward v. Orsini, 243 N.Y. 123, 127, 152 N.E. 696, 698 (1926).
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purpose on the part of the attorney to obtain an improper or undue advantage
12
over his client."'
In Wojcik v. Miller Bakeries Corporation3 the client in a personal injury
action discharged his former attorney and retained a second attorney to complete
the prosecution of the action. The question involved was whether the stipulation
entered into by the two attorneys and the client after the discharge of the first
attorney was binding, even though it called for compensation of the first
attorney for his services in an amount considered exorbitant by the court.
The majority of the Court of Appeals ruled that the Supreme Court had no
power to fix the original attorney's lien at a figure other than that agreed to in
the stipulation of substitution. The stipulation was entered into in accordance
with Rule 56 and was as effective as an order of substitution.14 Pointing out
that the attorney-client relationship had teiminated, and that there was no basis
for a finding of fraud or undue influence, especially in light of the fact that the
second attorney negotiated with the first for the stipulation and advised the client
to accept the same, the Court held that a valid contract between parties at arms
length had been made which could not be changed by judicial fiat.' r
Judges Dye, Van Voorhis, and Fuld dissented, arguing that insofar as a
stipulation is "in respect and in place of a contingent fee retainer' 0 for services
rendered, it is open to judicial scrutiny. In the view of the minority the agreement of stipulation, having been found as a matter of fact by Special Term to be
unconscionable and affirmed by the Appellate Division,'1 was excessive and out
of proportion to the services rendered, and the technical fact that the first attorney
was no longer retained by the client at the time of the stipulation of substitution
should not remove the actions of the said attorney from the court's scrutiny where
he was occupying the strategic position of attorney of record and stood in the
way of further progress of the personal injury action until he was removed
as such.' 8
The majority holding would appear to be in accord with existing law.
The client and the second attorney voluntarily entered into an agreement with
the appellant; no fraud or undue influence was in any way charged. Considering
that there was an expeditious method available for determining the prior
12.
(1906).
13.
14.
15.
(1957).
16.

Morehouse v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 185 N.Y. 520, 526, 78 N.E. 179, 181
2 N.Y.2d 631, 162 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1957).
N.Y. R. CIv. PRAc. 56.
Wojcik v. Miller Bakeries Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 631, 640, 162 N.Y.S.2d 337, 343
Ibid.

17. Id. at 646, 162 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
18. Id. at 648, 162 N.Y.S.2d at 349.
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attorney's lien,19 as well as provision for substitution by order under Rule 56,
there appears to be little merit in the argument of the dissenting justices that
the first attorney stood in the way of further progress and that the stipulation
was therefore not in any real sense voluntary. The interests of both attorneys
and clients appear to be adequately protected, and there should have been no
need for a stipulation for substitution in this case if either the second attorney
or the client was dissatisfied with the provisions urged by the original attorney.
Reduced to its simplest terms, this case reaffirms the position of Matter of
Peters20 that a court is without power "to remake or change a contract of retainer
validly made '"21 or, as here, a stipulation of substitution providing for compensation for an attorney's services.
Sovereign Power Of Stafe
The state as quasi-sovereign and representative of the interests of the public
has standing in court to protect the navigable and public bodies of water within its
territory.22 The ends of such protection must be for the best interest of the
23
public.
In People v. System Properties24 the people sought to have the state declared
owner of the bed of an outlet from Lake George. Their object was to place in
the state, control over a dam which lay in that outlet and affects the water level of
Lake George. The plaintiff alleged that the Lake and the outlet are navigable
waters and the state has title to their beds and therefore power to control the dam
and its interference with the public enjoyment of Lake George. The defendant
countered that the outlet was nonnavigable and that it owned the bed of the
outlet at the dam site.
The Court seemed to go out of its way to place ownership of the dam site
in defendant by adverse possession when it appeared that their deed would not
include the bed of the outlet. Next it in effect deemed the outlet nonnavigable and
19. Judge Van Voorhis in his dissent in the principal case at 650, 162
N.Y.S.2d at 351:
The object of section 475 of the Judiciary Law is to supply
swift' and expeditious mode of trying disputes of this
nature . . . . N.Y.R. Cir. PAc. 56, mupra note 3, provides
for changing attorney by order.
20. 271 App. Div. 518, 67 N.Y.S.2d 305 (3d Dep't 1946), mod. on other
grounds, 296 N.Y. 974, 73 N.E. 2d 560 (1947).
21. Id. at 523, 67 N.Y.S.2d at 310.
22. Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908); Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902).
23. Niagara Falls Power Co. v. Water P. & C. Commission, 267 N.Y. 265,
196 N.E. 51 (1935); Roth v. State, 262 App. Div. 370, 29 N.Y.S.2d 442 (4th Dep't
1941).
24. 2 N.Y.2d 330, 160 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1957).

